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Abstract
Converging theories suggest that organisms learn and exploit probabilistic models of their
environment. However, it remains unclear how such models can be learned in practice.
The open-ended complexity of natural environments means that it is generally infeasible
for organisms to model their environment comprehensively. Alternatively, action-oriented
models attempt to encode a parsimonious representation of adaptive agent-environment
interactions. One approach to learning action-oriented models is to learn online in the
presence of goal-directed behaviours. This constrains an agent to behaviourally relevant
trajectories, reducing the diversity of the data a model need account for. Unfortunately,
this approach can cause models to prematurely converge to sub-optimal solutions,
through a process we refer to as a bad-bootstrap. Here, we exploit the normative frame-
work of active inference to show that efficient action-oriented models can be learned by
balancing goal-oriented and epistemic (information-seeking) behaviours in a principled
manner. We illustrate our approach using a simple agent-based model of bacterial chemo-
taxis. We first demonstrate that learning via goal-directed behaviour indeed constrains
models to behaviorally relevant aspects of the environment, but that this approach is
prone to sub-optimal convergence. We then demonstrate that epistemic behaviours facili-
tate the construction of accurate and comprehensive models, but that these models are
not tailored to any specific behavioural niche and are therefore less efficient in their use of
data. Finally, we show that active inference agents learn models that are parsimonious,
tailored to action, and which avoid bad bootstraps and sub-optimal convergence. Criti-
cally, our results indicate that models learned through active inference can support
adaptive behaviour in spite of, and indeed because of, their departure from veridical repre-
sentations of the environment. Our approach provides a principled method for learning
adaptive models from limited interactions with an environment, highlighting a route to
sample efficient learning algorithms.
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Author summary
Within the popular framework of ‘active inference’, organisms learn internal models of
their environments and use the models to guide goal-directed behaviour. A challenge for
this framework is to explain how such models can be learned in practice, given (i) the rich
complexity of natural environments, and (ii) the circular dependence of model learning
and sensory sampling, which may lead to behaviourally suboptimal models being learned.
Here, we develop an approach in which organisms selectively model those aspects of the
environment that are relevant for acting in a goal-directed manner. Learning such
‘action-oriented’ models requires that agents balance information-seeking and goal-
directed actions in a principled manner, such that both learning and information seeking
are contextualised by goals. Using a combination of theory and simulation modelling, we
show that this approach allows simple but effective models to be learned from relatively
few interactions with the environment. Crucially, our results suggest that action-oriented
models can support adaptive behaviour in spite of, and indeed because of, their departure
from accurate representations of the environment.
Introduction
In order to survive, biological organisms must be able to efficiently adapt to and navigate in
their environment. Converging research in neuroscience, biology, and machine learning sug-
gests that organisms achieve this feat by exploiting probabilistic models of their world [1–8].
These models encode statistical representations of the states and contingencies in an environ-
ment and agent-environment interactions. Such models plausibly endow organisms with
several advantages. For instance, probabilistic models can be used to perform perceptual infer-
ence, implement anticipatory control, overcome sensory noise and delays, and generalize
existing knowledge to new tasks and environments. While encoding a probabilistic model can
be advantageous in these and other ways, natural environments are extremely complex and it
is infeasible to model them in their entirety. Thus it is unclear how organisms with limited
resources could exploit probabilistic models in rich and complex environments.
One approach to this problem is for organisms to selectively model their world in a way
that supports action [9–14]. We refer to such models as action-oriented, as their functional
purpose is to enable adaptive behaviour, rather than to represent the world in a complete or
accurate manner. An action-oriented representation of the world can depart from a veridical
representation in a number of ways. First, because only a subset of the states and contingencies
in an environment will be relevant for behaviour, action-oriented models need not exhaus-
tively model their environment [11]. Moreover, specific misrepresentations may prove to be
useful for action [15–18], indicating that action-oriented models need not be accurate. By
reducing the need for models to be isomorphic with their environment, an action-oriented
approach can increase the tractability of the model learning process [19–24], especially for
organisms with limited resources.
Within an action-oriented approach, an open question is how action-oriented models can
be learned from experience. The environment, in and of itself, provides no distinction between
states and contingencies that are relevant for behaviour and those which are not. However,
organisms do not receive information passively. Rather, organisms actively sample informa-
tion from their environment, a process which plays an important role in both perception and
learning [23, 25–27]. One way that active sampling can facilitate the learning of efficient
action-oriented models is to learn online in the presence of goal-directed actions. Performing
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goal-directed actions restricts an organism to behaviourally relevant trajectories through an
environment. This, in turn, structures sensory data in a behaviorally relevant way, thereby
reducing the diversity and dimensionality of the sampled data (see Fig 1). Therefore, this
approach offers an effective mechanism for learning parsimonious models that are tailored to
an organism’s adaptive requirements [19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29].
Learning probabilistic models to optimise behaviour has been extensively explored in the
model-based reinforcement learning (RL) literature [8, 30–32]. A significant drawback to
existing methods is that they tend to prematurely converge to sub-optimal solutions [33]. One
reason this occurs is due to the inherent coupling between action-selection and model learn-
ing. At the onset of learning, agents must learn from limited data, and this can lead to models
that initially overfit the environment and, as a consequence, make sub-optimal predictions
about the consequences of action. Subsequently using these models to determine goal-oriented
actions can result in biased and sub-optimal samples from the environment, further
Fig 1. The coupling of learning and control. (A) Goal-directed cycle of learning and control. A schematic overview of the coupling between a model
and its environment when learning takes place in the presence of goal-directed actions. Here, a model is learned based on sampled observations. This
model is then used to determine goal-directed actions, causing goal-relevant transitions in the environment, which in turn generate goal-relevant
observations. (B) Maladaptive cycle of learning and control. A schematic overview of the model-environment coupling when learning in the presence
of goal-directed actions, but for the case where a maladaptive model has been initially learned. The feedback inherent in the online learning scheme
means that the model samples sub-optimal observations, which are subsequently used to update the model, thus entrenching maladaptive cycles of
learning and control (bad bootstraps). (C) Observations sampled from random actions. The spread of observations covers the space of possible
observations uniformly, meaning that a model of these observations must account for a diverse and distributed set of data, increasing the model’s
complexity. The red circle in the upper right quadrant indicates the region of observation space associated with optimal behaviour, which is only
sparsely sampled. Note these are taken from a fictive simulation and are purely illustrative. (D) Observations sampled from sub-optimal goal-directed
actions. Only a small portion of observation space is sampled. A model of this data would, therefore, be more parsimonious in its representation of the
environment. However, the model prescribes actions that cause the agent to selectively sample a sub-optimal region of observation space (i.e outside the
red circle in the upper-right quadrant). As the agent only samples this portion of observation space, the model does not learn about more optimal
behaviours. (E) Observations sampled from optimal goal-directed actions. Here, as in D, the goal-directed nature of action ensures that only a small
portion of observation space is sampled. However, unlike D, this portion is associated with optimal behaviours.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805.g001
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compounding the model’s inefficiencies, and ultimately entrenching maladaptive cycles of
learning and control, a process we refer to as a “bad-bootstrap” (see Fig 1).
One obvious approach to resolving this problem is for an organism to perform some
actions, during learning, that are not explicitly goal-oriented. For example, heuristic methods,
such as ε-greedy [34], utilise noise to enable exploration at the start of learning. However, ran-
dom exploration of this sort is likely to be inefficient in rich and complex environments. In
such environments, a more powerful method is to utilize the uncertainty quantified by proba-
bilistic models to determine epistemic (or intrinsic, information-seeking, uncertainty reducing)
actions that attempt to minimize the model uncertainty in a directed manner [35–40]. While
epistemic actions can help avoid bad-bootstraps and sub-optimal convergence, such actions
necessarily increase the diversity and dimensionality of sampled data, thus sacrificing the ben-
efits afforded by learning in the presence of goal-directed actions. Thus, a principled and prag-
matic method is needed to learn action-oriented models in the presence of both goal-directed
and epistemic actions.
In this paper, we develop an effective method for learning action-oriented models. This
method balances goal-directed and epistemic actions in a principled manner, thereby ensuring
that an agent’s model is tailored to goal-relevant aspects of the environment, while also ensur-
ing that epistemic actions are contextualized by and directed towards an agent’s adaptive
requirements. To achieve this, we exploit the theoretical framework of active inference, a nor-
mative theory of perception, learning and action [41–43]. Active inference proposes that
organisms maintain and update a probabilistic model of their typical (habitable) environment
and that the states of an organism change to maximize the evidence for this model. Crucially,
both goal-oriented and epistemic actions are complementary components of a single impera-
tive to maximize model evidence—and are therefore evaluated in a common (information-the-
oretic) currency [38, 40, 43].
We illustrate this approach with a simple agent-based model of bacterial chemotaxis. This
model is not presented as a biologically-plausible account of chemotaxis, but instead, is used as
a relatively simple behaviour to evaluate the hypothesis that adaptive action-oriented models
can be learned via active inference. First, we confirm that learning in the presence of goal-
directed actions leads to parsimonious models that are tailored to specific behavioural niches.
Next, we demonstrate that learning in the presence of goal-directed actions alone can cause
agents to engage in maladaptive cycles of learning and control—‘bad bootstraps’—leading to
premature convergence on sub-optimal solutions. We then show that learning in the presence
of epistemic actions allows agents to learn accurate and exhaustive models of their environ-
ment, but that the learned models are not tailored to any behavioural niche, and are therefore
inefficient and unlikely to scale to complex environments. Finally, we demonstrate that balanc-
ing goal-directed and epistemic actions through active inference provides an effective method
for learning efficient action-oriented models that avoid maladaptive patterns of learning and
control. ‘Active inference’ agents learn well-adapted models from a relatively limited number
of agent-environment interactions and do so in a way that benefits from systematic representa-
tional inaccuracies. Our results indicate that probabilistic models can support adaptive behav-
iour in spite of, and moreover, because of, the fact they depart from veridical representations of
the external environment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two, we outline the active inference for-
malism, with a particular focus on how it prescribes both goal-directed and epistemic behav-
iour. In section three, we present the results of our agent-based simulations, and in section
four, we discuss these results and outline some broader implications. In section five, we outline
the methods used in our simulations, which are based on the Partially Observed Markov
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Learning action-oriented models
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Active inference is a normative theory that unifies perception, action and learning under a sin-
gle imperative—the minimization of variational free energy [42, 43]. Free energy Fð�; oÞ is
defined as:
Fð�; oÞ ¼ KL½Qðxj�ÞjjPðx; oÞ�
¼ KL½Qðxj�ÞjjPðxjoÞ�   lnPðoÞ
ð1Þ
whereKL is the Kullback-Libeler divergence (KL-divergence) between two probability distri-
butions, both of which are parameterized by the internal states of an agent. The first is the
approximate posterior distribution, Q(x|ϕ), often referred to as the recognition distribution,
which is a distribution over unknown or latent variables x with sufficient statistics ϕ. This dis-
tribution encodes an agent’s ‘beliefs’ about the unknown variables x. Here, the term ‘belief’
does not necessarily refer to beliefs in the cognitive sense but instead implies a probabilistic
representation of unknown variables. The second distribution is the generative model, P(x, o),
which is the joint distribution over unknown variables x and observations o. This distribution
encodes an agent’s probabilistic model of its (internal and external) environment. We provide
two additional re-arrangements of Eq 1 in Appendix 1.
Minimizing free energy has two functional consequences. First, it minimizes the divergence
between the approximate posterior distribution Q(x|ϕ) and the true posterior distribution P(x|
o), thereby implementing a tractable form of approximate Bayesian inference known as varia-
tional Bayes [44]. On this view, perception can be understood as the process of maintaining
and updating beliefs about hidden state variables s, where s 2 S. The hidden state variables
can either be a compressed representation of the potentially high-dimensional observations
(i.e. representing an object), or they can represent quantities that are not directly observable
(i.e. velocity). This casts perception as a process of approximate inference, connecting active
inference to influential theories such as the Bayesian brain hypothesis [45, 46] and predictive
coding [47]. Under active inference, learning can also be understood as a process of approxi-
mate inference [43]. This can be formalized by assuming that agents maintain and update
beliefs over the parameters θ of their generative model, where θ 2 Θ. Finally, action can be cast
as a process of approximate inference by assuming that agents maintain and update beliefs
over control states u, where u 2 U , which prescribe actions a, where a 2 A. The delineation of
control states from actions helps highlight the fact that actions are something which occur ‘in
the world’, whereas control states are unknown random variables that the agent must infer.
Together, this implies that x = (s, θ, u). Approximate inference, encompassing perception,






In other words, as new observations are sampled, the sufficient statistics ϕ are updated in
order to minimize free energy (see the Methods section for the implementation used in the
current simulations, or [48] for an alternative implementation based on the Laplace approxi-
mation). Once the optimal sufficient statistics ϕ� have been identified, the approximate poste-
rior will become an approximation of the true posterior distribution Q(x|ϕ�)�P(x|o), meaning
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Learning action-oriented models
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that agents will encode approximately optimal beliefs over hidden states s, model parameters θ
and control states u.
The second consequence of minimizing free energy is that it maximizes the Bayesian evi-
dence for an agents generative model, or equivalently, minimizes ‘surprisal’ −ln P(o), which is
the information-theoretic surprise of sampled observations (see Appendix 1). Active inference
proposes that an agent’s goals, preferences and desires are encoded in the generative model as
a prior preference for favourable observations (e.g. blood temperature at 37˚) [49]. In other
words, it proposes that an agent’s generative model is biased towards favourable states of
affairs. These prior preferences could be learned from experience, or alternatively, acquired
through processes operating on evolutionary timescales. The process of actively minimizing
free energy will, therefore, ensure that these favourable (i.e. probable) observations are prefer-
entially sampled [50]. However, model evidence cannot be directly maximized through the
inference scheme described by Eq 2, as the marginal probability of observations P(o) is inde-
pendent of the sufficient statistics ϕ. Therefore, to maximize model evidence, agents must act
in order to change their observations. This process can be achieved in a principled manner by
selecting actions in order to minimize expected free energy, which is the free energy that is
expected to occur from executing some (sequence of) actions [38, 51].
Expected free energy. To ensure that actions minimize (the path integral of) free energy,
an agent’s generative model should specify that control states are a-priori more likely if they
are expected to minimize free energy in the future, thus ensuring that the process of approxi-
mate inference assigns a higher posterior probability to the control states that are expected to
minimize free energy [52]. The expected free energy for a candidate control state Gτ(ϕτ, ut)
quantifies the free energy expected at some future time τ given the execution of some control
state ut, where t is the current time point and:
Gtð�t; utÞ ¼ EQðot;xtjut ;�tÞ½ lnQðxtjut; �tÞ   lnPðot; xtjutÞ�
� EQðot;xtjut ;�tÞ½ lnQðxtjut; �tÞ   lnQðxtjot; ut; �tÞ�|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
ðNegativeÞ epistemic value
  EQðot ;xtjut ;�tÞ½ lnPðotÞ�|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
ðNegativeÞ instrumental value
ð3Þ
We describe the formal relationship between free energy and expected free energy in
Appendix 2. In order to evaluate expected free energy, agents must first evaluate the expected
consequences of control, or formally, evaluate the predictive approximate posterior Q(oτ, xτ|ut,
ϕτ). We refer readers to the Methods section for a description of this process.
The second (approximate) equality of Eq 3 demonstrates that expected free energy is com-
posed of an instrumental (or extrinsic, pragmatic, goal-directed) component and an epistemic
(or intrinsic, uncertainty-reducing, information-seeking) component. Note that under active
inference, agents are mandated to minimize expected free energy, and as both the instrumental
and epistemic terms are in a negative form in Eq 3, expected free energy will be minimized
when instrumental and epistemic value are maximized. We provide a full derivation of the sec-
ond equality in Appendix 3, but note here that the decomposition of expected free energy into
instrumental and epistemic value affords an intuitive explanation. Namely, as free energy
quantifies the divergence between an agent’s current beliefs and its model of the world, this
divergence can be minimized via two methods: by changing beliefs such that they align with
observations (associated with maximizing epistemic value), or by changing observations such
that they align with beliefs (associated with maximizing instrumental value).
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Learning action-oriented models
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Formally, instrumental value quantifies the degree to which the predicted observations oτ—
given by the predictive approximate posterior Q(oτ, xτ|ut, ϕτ)—are consistent with the agents
prior beliefs P(oτ). In other words, this term will be maximized when an agent expects to sam-
ple observations that are consistent with its prior beliefs. As an agent’s generative model
assigns a higher prior probability to favourable observations (i.e. goals and desires), maximiz-
ing instrumental value can be associated with promoting ‘goal-directed’ behaviours. This for-
malizes the notion that, under active inference, agents seek to maximize the evidence for their
(biased) model of the world, rather than seeking to maximize reward as a separate construct
(as in, e.g., reinforcement learning) [49].
Conversely, epistemic value quantifies the expected reduction in uncertainty in the beliefs
over unknown variables x. Formally, it quantifies the expected information gain for the predic-
tive approximate posterior Q(xτ|ut, ϕτ). By noting that that x can be factorized into hidden
states s and model parameters θ, we can rewrite positive epistemic value (i.e. the term to be
maximized) as:
EQðot;st;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnQðstjot; ut; �tÞ   lnQðstjut; �tÞ�|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
State epistemic value
þ
EQðot;st;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnQðyjst; ot; ut; �tÞ   lnQðyj�tÞ�|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Parameter epistemic value
ð4Þ
We provide a full derivation of Eq 4 in Appendix 4 and discuss its relationship to several
established formalisms. Here, we have decomposed epistemic value into state epistemic value,
or salience, and parameter epistemic value, or novelty[53]. State epistemic value quantifies the
degree to which the expected observations oτ reduce the uncertainty in an agent’s beliefs about
the hidden states sτ. In contrast, parameter epistemic value quantifies the degree to which the
expected observations oτ and expected hidden states sτ reduce the uncertainty in an agent’s
beliefs about model parameters θ. Thus, by maintaining a distribution over model parameters,
the uncertainty in an agent’s generative model can be quantified, allowing for ‘known
unknowns’ to be identified and subsequently acted upon [40]. Maximizing parameter episte-
mic value, therefore, causes agents to sample novel agent-environment interactions, promot-
ing the exploration of the environment in a principled manner.
Summary. In summary, active inference proposes that agents learn and update a probabi-
listic model of their world, and act to maximize the evidence for this model. However, in con-
trast to previous ‘perception-oriented’ approaches to constructing probabilistic models [11],
active inference requires an agent’s model to be intrinsically biased towards certain (favourable)
observations. Therefore, the goal is not necessarily to construct a model that accurately captures
the true causal structure underlying observations, but is instead to learn a model that is tailored
to a specific set of prior preferences, and thus tailored to a specific set of agent-environment
interactions. Moreover, by ensuring that actions maximize evidence for a (biased) model of the
world, active inference prescribes a trade-off between instrumental and epistemic actions. Cru-
cially, the fact that actions are selected based on both instrumental and epistemic value means
that epistemic foraging will be contextualized by an agent’s prior preferences. Specifically, epi-
stemic foraging will be biased towards parts of the environment that also provide instrumental
value, as these parts will entail a lower expected free energy relative to those that provide no
instrumental value. Moreover, the degree to which epistemic value determines the selection of
actions will depend on instrumental value. Thus, when the instrumental value afforded by a set
of actions is low, epistemic value will dominate action selection, whereas if actions afford a high
degree of instrumental value, epistemic value will have less influence on the action selection.
Finally, as agents maintain beliefs about (and thus quantify the uncertainty of) the hidden state
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Learning action-oriented models
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of the environment and the parameters of their generative model, epistemic value promotes
agents to actively reduce the uncertainty in both of these beliefs.
Simulation details
To test our hypothesis that acting to minimize expected free energy will lead to the learning of
well-adapted action-oriented models, we empirically compare the types of model that are
learned under four different action strategies. These are the (i) minimization of expected free
energy, (ii) maximization of instrumental value, (iii) maximization of epistemic value, and (iv)
random action selection, where the minimization of expected free energy (i) corresponds to a
combination of the instrumental (ii) and epistemic (iii) strategies. For each strategy, we assess
model performance after a range of model learning durations. We assess model performance
across several criteria, including whether or not the models can prescribe well-adapted behav-
iour, the complexity and accuracy of the learned models, whether the models are tailored to a
behavioural niche, and whether or not the models become entrenched in maladaptive cycles of
learning and control (‘bad-bootstraps’).
We implement a simple agent-based model of bacterial chemotaxis that infers and learns
based on the active inference scheme described above. Specifically, our model implements the
‘adaptive gradient climbing’ behaviour of E. coli. Note that we do not propose our model as a
biologically realistic account of bacterial chemotaxis. Instead, we use chemotaxis as a relatively
simple behaviour that permits a thorough analysis of the learned models. However, the active
inference scheme described in this paper has a degree of biological plausibility [54], and there
is some evidence to suggest that bacteria engage in model-based behaviours [55–58]. This
behaviour depends on the chemical gradient at the bacteria’s current orientation. In positive
chemical gradients, bacteria ‘run’ forward in the direction of their current orientation. In neg-
ative chemical gradients, bacteria ‘tumble’, resulting in a new orientation being sampled. This
behaviour, therefore, implements a rudimentary biased random-walk towards higher concen-
trations of chemicals. To simulate the adaptive gradient climbing behaviour of E. coli, we
utilize the partially observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP) framework [59]. This frame-
work implies that agents do not have direct access to the true state of the environment, that the
state of the environment only depends on the previous state and the agent’s previous action,
and that all variables and time are discrete. Note that while agents operate on discrete repre-
sentations of the environment, the true states of the environment (i.e the agent’s position, the
location of the chemical source, and the chemical concentrations) are continuous.
At each time step t, agents receive one of two observations, either a positive chemical gradi-
ent opos or a negative chemical gradient oneg. The chemical gradient is computed as a function
of space (whether the agent is facing towards the chemical source) rather than time (whether
the agent is moving towards the chemical source) [60], and thus only depends on the agent’s
current position and orientation, and the position of the chemical source. After receiving an
observation, agents update their beliefs in order to minimize free energy. In the current simu-
lations, agents maintain and update beliefs over three variables. The first is the hidden state
variable s, which represents the agent’s belief about the local chemical gradient, and which has
a domain of {spos, sneg}, representing positive and negative chemical gradients, respectively.
The second belief is over the parameters θ of the agent’s generative model, which describe the
probability of transitions in the environment, given action. The final belief is over the control
variable u, which has the domain of {urun, utumble}, representing running and tumbling
respectively. Agents are also endowed with the prior belief that observing positive chemical
gradients opos is a-priori more likely, such that the evidence for an agent’s model is maximized
(and free energy minimized) when sampling positive chemical gradients.
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Once beliefs have been updated, agents execute one of two actions, either run arun or tum-
ble atumble, depending on which of the corresponding control states was inferred to be more
likely. Running causes the agent to move forward one unit in the direction of their current ori-
entation, whereas tumbling causes the agent to sample a new orientation at random. The envi-
ronment is then updated and a new time step begins. We refer the reader to the Methods
section for a full description of the agents generative model, approximate posterior, and the
corresponding update equations for inference, learning and action.
Agents
All of the action strategies we compare infer posterior beliefs over hidden states, model param-
eters and control states via the minimization of free energy. However, they differ in how they
assign prior (and thus posterior) probability to control states. The first strategy we consider is
based on the minimization of expected free energy, which entails the following prior over con-
trol states:
PEFEðutÞ ¼ sð EQðot;st;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnQðyjst; ot; ut; �tÞ   lnQðyj�tÞ�
þ EQðot;st ;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnPðotÞ�Þ
ð5Þ
where σ(�) is the softmax function, which ensures that PEFE(ut) is a valid distribution. The
first term corresponds to parameter epistemic value, or ‘novelty’, and quantifies the amount
of information the agent expects to gain about their (beliefs about their) model parameters
θ. The second term corresponds to instrumental value and quantifies the degree to which
the expected observations conform to prior beliefs. Therefore, the expected free energy
agent selects actions that are expected to result in probable (‘favourable’) observations, and
that are expected to disclose maximal information about the consequences of action. Note
that in the following simulations, agents have no uncertainty in their likelihood distribution,
which describes the relationship between the hidden state variables s and the observations o
(see Methods). As such, the expected free energy agent does not assign probability to control
states based on state epistemic value. Formally, when there is no uncertainty in the likeli-
hood distribution, state epistemic value reduces to the entropy of the predictive approximate
posterior over s, see [38]. For simplicity, we have omitted this term from the current
simulations.
The second strategy is the instrumental, or ‘goal-directed’, strategy, which utilizes the fol-
lowing prior over control states:
PInstrumental ðutÞ ¼ sðEQðot;st;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnPðotÞ�Þ ð6Þ
The instrumental agent, therefore, selects actions that are expected to give rise to favourable
observations. The third strategy is the epistemic, or ‘information-seeking’, strategy, which is
governed by the following prior over control states:
PEpistemic ðutÞ ¼ sðEQðot ;st ;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnQðyjst; ot; ut; �tÞ   lnQðyj�tÞ�Þ ð7Þ
The epistemic agent selects actions that are expected to disclose maximal information about
model parameters. The final strategy is the random strategy, which assigns prior probability to
actions at random. These models were chosen to explore the relative contributions of instru-
mental and epistemic value to model learning, and crucially, to understand their combined
influence. We predict that, when acting to minimize expected free energy, agent’s will engage
in a form of goal-directed exploration that is biased by their prior preferences, leading to adap-
tive action-oriented models. In contrast, we expect that (i) the instrumental agent will
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occasionally become entrenched in bad-bootstraps, due to the lack of exploration, and (ii) the
epistemic agent will explore portions of state space irrelevant to behaviour, leading to slower
learning. An overview of the model can be found in Fig 2 and implementation details for all
four strategies are provided in the Methods section.
Fig 2. Simulation & model details. (A) Agent overview. Agents act in an environment which is described by states ψ, which are
unknown to the agent but generate observations o. The agent maintains beliefs about the state of the environment s, however, s and
ψ need not be homologous. Agents also maintain beliefs about control states u, which in turn prescribe actions a. Finally, the agent
maintains beliefs over model parameters θ, which describe the probability of transitions in s under different control states u. (B)
Actions. At each time step, agents can either run, which moves them forward one unit in the direction of their current orientation,
or tumble, which causes a new orientation to be sampled at random. (C) Approximate posterior. The factorization of the
approximate posterior, and the definition of each factor. In this figure, x denotes the variables that an agent infers and ϕ denotes the
parameters of the approximate posterior. We refer readers to Methods section for a full description of these distributions. (D)
Generative model. The factorization of the generative model and the definition of each factor. Here, λ denotes the parameters of
likelihood distribution and α denotes the parameters of the prior distribution over parameters. We again refer readers to the
methods section for full descriptions of these distributions. (E) Free energy minimization. The general scheme for free energy
minimization under the mean-field assumption. We refer readers to the Methods section for further details. (F) Control state
inference. The update equation for control state inference, where ~Q ¼ Qðot; st; yjutÞ. This equation highlights the difference
between the three action-strategies considered in the following simulations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805.g002
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Model performance
We first assess whether the learned models can successfully generate chemotactic behaviour.
We quantify this by measuring an agent’s distance from the source after an additional (i.e.,
post-learning) testing phase. Each testing phase begins by placing an agent at a random loca-
tion and orientation 400 units from the chemical source. The agent is then left to act in the
environment for 1000 time steps, utilizing the model that was learned during the preceding
learning phase. No additional learning takes place during the testing phase. As the epistemic
and random action strategies do not assign any instrumental (goal-oriented) value to actions,
there is no tendency for them to navigate towards the chemical source. Therefore, to ensure a
fair comparison between action strategies, all agents select actions based on the minimization
of expected free energy during the testing phase. This allows us to assess whether the epistemic
and random strategies can learn models that can support chemotactic behaviour, and ensures
that any observed differences are determined solely by attributes of the learned models.
Fig 3a shows the final distance from the source at the end of the testing phase, plotted
against the duration of the preceding learning phase, and averaged over 300 learned models
for each action strategy and learning duration. The final distance of the expected free energy,
epistemic and random strategies decreases with the amount of time spent learning, meaning
that these action strategies were able to learn models which support chemotactic behaviour.
However, the instrumental strategy shows little improvement over baseline performance, irre-
spective of the amount of time spent learning. Note that the first learning period consists of
zero learning steps, meaning that the corresponding distance gives the (averaged) baseline per-
formance for a randomly initialized model. This is less than the initial distance (400 units) as
some of the randomly initialized models can support chemotaxis without any learning. The
final distance from the source for the expected free energy, epistemic and random agents is not
zero due to the nature of the adaptive-hill climbing chemotaxis strategy, which causes agents
to not to settle directly on the source, but instead navigate around its local vicinity. Models
Fig 3. (A) Chemotactic performance. The average final distance from the chemical source after an additional testing phase, in which agents utilized
the models learned in the corresponding learning phase. The average distance is plotted against the number of steps in the corresponding learning
phase and is averaged over 300 models for each strategy and learning duration. Note that the x-axis denotes the number of time steps in the learning
phase, rather than the number of time steps in the subsequent testing phase. Filled regions show +-SEM. (B) Examples trajectories. The spatial
trajectories of agents who successfully navigated up the chemical gradient towards the chemical source.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805.g003
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learned by the expected free energy strategy consistently finish close to the chemical source,
and learn chemotactic behaviour after fewer learning steps relative to the other strategies.
Model accuracy
We now move on to consider whether learning in the presence of goal-oriented behaviour
leads to models that are tailored to a behavioural niche. First, we assess how each action strat-
egy affects the overall accuracy of the learned models. To test this, we measure the KL-diver-
gence between the learned models and a ‘true’ model of agent-environment dynamics. Here, a
‘true’ model describes a model that has the same variables, structure and fixed parameters, but
which has had infinite training data over all possible action-state contingencies. Due to the fact
that the true generative process does not admit the notion of a prior, we measure the accuracy
of the expectation of the approximate posterior distribution over parameters θ, i.e. E½Qðyj�aÞ�.
Fig 4a shows the average accuracy of the learned models for each action strategy, plotted
against the amount of time spent learning. These results demonstrate that the epistemic and
random strategies consistently learn the most accurate models while the instrumental strategy
consistently learns the least accurate models. However, the expected free energy strategy learns
a model that is significantly less accurate than both the epistemic and random strategies, indi-
cating that the most well-adapted models are not necessarily the most accurate.
Fig 4a additionally suggests that the epistemic and random strategies learn equally accurate
models. This result may appear surprising, as the epistemic strategy actively seeks out transi-
tions that are expected to improve model accuracy. However, given the limited number of pos-
sible state transitions in the current simulation, it is plausible that a random strategy offers a
near-optimal solution to exploration. To confirm this, we evaluated the accuracy of models
learned by the epistemic and random strategies in high-dimensional state space. The results of
this experiment are given in Appendix 6, where it can be seen that the epistemic strategy does
indeed learn models that are considerably more accurate than the random strategy.
We hypothesized that the expected free energy and instrumental strategies learned less
accurate models because they were acting in a goal-oriented manner while learning. This, in
turn, may have caused these strategies to selectively sample particular (behaviourally-relevant)
transitions, at the cost of sampling other (behaviourally-irrelevant) transitions less frequently.
To confirm this, we measured the distribution of state transitions sampled by each of the strat-
egies after 1000 time steps learning, averaged over 300 agents. Because agents learn an action-
conditioned representation of state transitions, i.e. P(st|st−1, ut−1, θ), we separate state transitions
that follow agents running from those that follow agents tumbling. Here, the notion of a state
transition refers to a change in the state of the environment as a function of time, i.e. a positive
to negative state transition implies that the agent was in a positive chemical gradient at time t
and a negative chemical gradient at t + 1. These results are shown in Fig 4b. For the epistemic
and random strategies, the distribution is uniformly spread over (realizable) state transitions
(running-induced transitions from positive to negative and negative to positive gradients are
rare for all strategies, as such transitions can only occur in small portions of the environment).
In contrast, the distributions sampled by the expected free energy and instrumental strategies
are heavily biased towards a running-induced transitions from positive gradients to again a
positive gradient. This is the transition that occurs when an agent is ‘running up the chemical
gradient’, i.e., performing chemotaxis. The bias means that the remaining transitions between
states are sampled less, relative to the epistemic and random strategies.
How do the learned models differ, among the four action strategies? To address this ques-
tion, we measured the post-learning change in different distributions of the full model. This
change reflects a measure of ‘how much’ an agent has learned about that particular
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Fig 4. Model accuracy. (A) Model accuracy. The average negative model accuracy, measured as the KL-divergence from a ‘true’ model of agent-
environment dynamics. The accuracy is plotted against the number of steps in the corresponding learning phase and is averaged over 300 models for
each strategy. Filled regions show +-SEM. (B) Distributions of state transitions. The distribution of action-dependent state transitions for each
strategy over 1000 learning steps, averaged over 300 models for each strategy. Here, columns indicate the state at the previous time step, whereas rows
indicate the state following the transition. The top matrices display transitions that follow from tumbling, whereas the bottom matrices display
transitions that follow from running. The numbers indicate the percentage of time that the corresponding state transition was encountered. For
instance, the top left box denotes the percentage of time the agent experienced negative to negative state transitions following a tumbling action. Note
that the distribution of transitions encountered by the epistemic and random strategies corresponds, within a small margin of error, to the distribution
of transitions encountered by a ‘true’ model, i.e. a model that has been learned from infinite transitions with no behavioural biases. (C) Change in
distributions. The average change in each of the distributions of the full learned model, measured as the KL-divergence between the original
(randomly-initialized) distributions and the final (post-learning) distribution. Refer to Methods section for a description of these distributions. (D & E)
Reversed preferences. These results are the same as for panels B & C, but for the case where agents have reversed preferences (i.e. priors). Here, agents
believe running down chemical gradients to be more likely. The results demonstrate that the models of expected free energy and instrumental agent are
sensitive to prior preferences. (F) Active/passive prediction error. The cumulative mean squared error of counterfactual predictions about state
transitions, over 1000 steps learning and averaged over 300 agents. The active condition describes predictions of state-transitions following self-
determined actions, whereas the passive condition describes predictions following random actions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805.g004
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distribution. As described in the Methods, the full transition model P(st|st−1, ut−1, θ) is com-
posed of four separate categorical distributions. The first describes the effects of tumbling in
negative gradients, the second describes the effects of tumbling in positive gradients, the third
describes the effects of running in negative gradients, and fourth describes the effects of run-
ning in positive gradients. Fig 4c plots the KL-divergence between each of the original (ran-
domly-initialized) distributions and the subsequent (post-learning) distributions. These
results show that the expected free energy and instrumental strategies learn substantially less
about three of the distributions, compared to the epistemic and random agents, explaining the
overall reduction of accuracy displayed in Fig 4a. However, for the distribution describing the
effects of running in positive gradients, the instrumental strategy learns as much as the episte-
mic and random strategies, while the expected free energy strategy learns substantially more.
These results, therefore, demonstrate that acting in a goal-oriented manner biases an agent to
preferentially sample particular (goal-relevant) transitions in the environment and that this, in
turn, causes agents to learn more about these (goal-relevant) transitions.
To further verify this result, we repeated the analysis described in Fig 4b and 4c, but for the
case where agents learn in the presence of reversed prior preferences (i.e. the agents believe
that observing negative chemical gradients is a-priori more likely, and thus preferable). The
results for these simulations are shown in 4d and 4e, where it can be seen that the expected
free energy and instrumental strategy now preferentially sample running-induced transitions
from negative to negative gradients, and learn more about the distribution describing the
effects of running in negative gradients. This is the distribution relevant to navigating down
the chemical gradient, a result that is expected if the learned models are biased towards prior
preferences. By contrast, the models learned by the epistemic and random agents are not
dependent on their prior beliefs or preferences.
Active and passive accuracy
The previous results suggest that learning in the presence of goal-directed behaviour leads to
models that are biased towards certain patterns of agent-environment interaction. To further
elucidate this point, we distinguish between active accuracy and passive accuracy. We define
active accuracy as the accuracy of a model in the presence of the agents own self-determined
actions (i.e. the actions chosen according to the agent’s strategy), and passive accuracy as the
accuracy of a model in the presence of random actions. We measured both the passive and
active accuracy of the models learned under different action strategies following 300 time-
steps of learning. To do this, we let agents act in their environment for an additional 1000 time
steps according to their action strategy, and, at each time step, measured the accuracy of their
counterfactual predictions about state transitions. In the active condition, agents predicted the
consequence of a self-determined action, whereas, in the passive condition, agents predicted
the consequence of a randomly selected action. We then measured the mean squared error
between the agents’ predictions and the ‘true’ predictions (i.e. the predictions given by the
‘true’ model, as described for Fig 4a). The accumulated prediction errors for the passive and
active conditions are shown in Fig 4f, averaged over 300 learned models for each strategy. As
expected, there is no difference between the passive and active condition for the random strat-
egy, as this strategy selects actions at random. The epistemic strategy shows the highest active
error, which is due to the fact that the epistemic strategy seeks out novel (and thus less predict-
able) transitions. The instrumental strategy has the lowest active prediction error, and there-
fore the highest active accuracy. This is consistent with the view that learning in the presence
of goal-directed behaviour allows agents to learn models that are accurate in the presence of
their self-determined behaviour. Finally, the expected free energy strategy has an active error
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that is lower than the epistemic and random strategies, but higher than the instrumental strat-
egy. This arises from the fact that the expected free energy strategy balances both goal-directed
and epistemic actions. Note that, in the current context, active accuracy is improved at the cost
of passive accuracy. While the instrumental strategy learns the least accurate model, it is the
most accurate at predicting the consequences of its self-determined actions.
Pruning parameters
We now consider whether learning in the presence of goal-directed behaviour leads to simpler
models of agent-environment dynamics. A principled way to approach this question is to ask
whether each of the model’s parameters are increasing or decreasing the Bayesian evidence for
the overall model, which provides a measure of both the accuracy and the complexity of a
model. In brief, if a parameter decreases model evidence, then removing—or ‘pruning’—that
parameter results in a model with higher evidence. This procedure can, therefore, provide a
measure of how many ‘redundant’ parameters a model has, which, in turn, provides a measure
of the complexity of a model (assuming that redundant parameters can, and should, be
removed). We utilise the method of Bayesian model reduction [61] to evaluate the evidence for
models with removed parameters. This procedure allows us to evaluate the evidence for
reduced models without having to refit the model’s parameters.
We first let each of the strategies learn a model for 500 time-steps. The parameters opti-
mized during this learning period are then treated as priors for an additional (i.e., post-learn-
ing) testing phase. During this testing phase, agents act according to their respective strategies
for an additional 500 time-steps, resulting in posterior estimates of the parameters.
Given the prior parameters α and posterior parameters ϕα, we can evaluate an approxima-
tion for the change in model evidence under a reduced model through the equation:
DF ¼ lnBð�aÞ þ lnBða0Þ   lnBðaÞ   lnBð�a þ a0   aÞ ð8Þ
where ln B(�) is the beta function, α0 are the prior parameters of the reduced model, and F is
the variational free energy, which provides a tractable approximation of the Bayesian model
evidence. See [40] for a derivation of Eq 8. If DF is positive, then the reduced model—
described by the reduced priors α0—has less evidence than the full model, and vice versa. We
remove each of the prior parameters individually by setting their value to zero and evaluate
Eq 8. Fig 5a shows the percentage of trials that each parameter was pruned for each of the
action strategies, averaged over 300 trials for each strategy. For the instrumental and epistemic
agents, the parameters describing the effects of running in negative gradients and tumbling in
positive gradients are most often pruned, as these are the parameters that are irrelevant to che-
motaxis (which involves running in positive chemical gradients and tumbling in negative
chemical gradients). In Fig 5b we plot the total number of parameters pruned, averaged over
300 agents. These results demonstrate that the expected free energy strategy entails models
that have the highest number of redundant parameters, followed by the instrumental strategy.
Under the assumption that redundant parameters can, and should, be pruned, the expected
free energy and instrumental strategies learn simpler models, compared to the epistemic and
random strategies. These results additionally suggest that pruning parameters will prove to be
more beneficial (in terms of model complexity) for action-oriented models.
Bad bootstraps and sub-optimal convergence
In the Introduction, we hypothesized that ‘bad-bootstraps’ occur when agents (and their mod-
els) become stuck in maladaptive cycles of learning and control, resulting in an eventual failure
to learn well-adapted models. To test for the presence of bad-bootstraps, we allowed agents to
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learn models over an extended period of 4,000-time steps. We allowed this additional time to
exclude the possibility that opportunities to learn had not been fully exploited by agents. (We
additionally conducted the same experiment with 10,000-time steps; results were unchanged).
We then tested the learned models on their ability to support chemotaxis, by allowing them to
interact with their environment for an additional 1,000 time-steps using the expected free
energy action strategy. To quantify whether the learned models were able to perform chemo-
taxis in any form, we measured whether the agent had moved more than 50 units towards the
source by the end of the testing period.
After 4,000 learning steps, all the agents that had learned models using the expected free
energy, epistemic or random strategies were able to perform at least some chemotaxis. In con-
trast 36% of the agents that had learned models under maximization of instrumental value did
not engage in any chemotaxis at all. To better understand why instrumental agents frequently
failed to learn well-adapted models, even after significant learning, we provide an analysis of a
randomly selected failed model. This model prescribes a behavioural profile whereby agents
continually tumble, even in positive chemical gradients. This arises from the belief that tum-
bling is more likely to give rise to positive gradients, even when the agent is in positive gradi-
ents. In other words, the model encodes the erroneous belief that, in positive gradients,
running will be less likely to give rise to positive chemical gradients, relative to tumbling.
Given this belief, the agent continually tumbles, and therefore never samples information that
disconfirms this maladaptive belief. This exemplifies a ‘bad bootstrap’ arising from the goal-
directed nature of the agent’s action strategy.
Finally, we explore how assigning epistemic value to actions can help overcome bad boot-
straps. We analyse an agent which acts to minimize expected free energy, quantifying the rela-
tive contributions of epistemic and instrumental value to running and tumbling. We initialize
an agent with a randomly selected maladapted model and allow the agent to interact with (and
learn from) the environment according to the expected free energy action strategy (i.e using
the E.F.E agent). In Fig 6a, we plot the (negative) expected free energy of the running and tum-
bling control states over time, along with the relative contributions of instrumental and episte-
mic value. These results show that the (negative) expected free energy for the tumble control
state is initially higher than that of the running control state because the agent believes there is
less instrumental value in running. This causes the agent to tumble, which in turn causes the
agent to gather information about the effects of tumbling. Consequently, the model becomes
Fig 5. Model complexity. (A) Number of pruned parameters. Percentage of times each parameter was pruned, averaged over 300 agents. A parameter
was pruned if it decreased the evidence for agents model. (B) Total pruned parameters. The average number of total number of pruned parameters,
averaged over 300 agents.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805.g005
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less uncertain about the expected effects of tumbling, thereby decreasing the epistemic value of
tumbling (and thus the (negative) expected free energy of tumbling). This continues until the
negative expected free energy of tumbling becomes less than that of running, which has
remained constant (since the agent has not yet gained any new information about running).
At this point, the agent infers running to be the more likely action, which causes the agent to
run. The epistemic value of running now starts to decrease, but as it does so the new sampled
observations disclose information that running is very likely to cause transitions from positive
to positive gradients (i.e., to maintain positive gradients). The instrumental value of running
(and thus the negative expected free energy of running) therefore sharply increases in positive
gradients, causing the agent to continue to run in positive gradients. Note that this agent did
not fully resolve its uncertainty about tumbling. This highlights the fact that, under active
inference, the epistemic value of an action is contextualized by current instrumental
imperatives.
Discussion
Equipping agents with generative models provides a powerful solution to prescribing well-
adapted behaviour in structured environments. However, these models must, at least in part,
be learned. For behaving agents—i.e., biological agents—the learning of generative models
necessarily takes place in the presence of actions; i.e., in an ‘online’ fashion, during ongoing
behaviour. Such models must also be geared towards prescribing actions that are useful for the
agent. How to learn such ‘action-oriented’ models poses significant challenges for both
computational biology and model-based reinforcement learning (RL).
Fig 6. Overcoming bad-bootstraps. (A) Expected free energy. A plot of expected free energy for run and tumble control states
overtime for an agent with an initially maladapted model. This model encodes the erroneous belief that running is less likely to give rise
to positive chemical gradients, relative to tumbling. Therefore, at the start of the trial, the instrumental value of tumbling (green dotted
line) is higher than the instrumental value of running (purple dotted line). The epistemic value of both running and tumbling (brown
and red dotted lines, respectively) is initially the same. As the (negative) expected free energy for tumbling (orange line) is higher than
the (negative) expected free energy for running (blue line), the agent tumbles for the first 900 time steps. During this time, agents gain
information about the effects of tumbling, and the epistemic value of tumbling decreases, causing the negative expected free energy for
tumbling to also decrease. This continues until the negative expected free energy is for tumbling is lower than the negative expected free
energy for running, which has remained constant. Agents then run and gather information about the effects of running. This causes the
epistemic value of running to decrease, but also causes the instrumental value of running to sharply increase, as the new information
disconfirms their erroneous belief that running will not give rise to positive gradients.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805.g006
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In this paper, we have demonstrated that the active inference framework provides a princi-
pled and pragmatic approach to learning adaptive action-oriented models. Under this
approach, the minimization of expected free energy prescribes an intrinsic and context-sensi-
tive balance between goal-directed (instrumental) and information-seeking (epistemic) behav-
iours, thereby shaping the learning of the underlying generative models. After developing the
formal framework, we illustrated its utility using a simple agent-based model of bacterial che-
motaxis. We compared three situations. When agents learned solely in the presence of goal-
directed actions, the learned models were specialized to the agent’s behavioural niche but were
prone to converging to sub-optimal solutions, due to the instantiation of ‘bad-bootstraps’.
Conversely, when agents learned solely in the presence of epistemic (information-seeking)
actions, they learned accurate models which avoided sub-optimal convergence, but at the cost
of reduced sample efficiency due to the lack of behavioural specialisation.
Finally, we showed that the minimisation of expected free-energy effectively-balanced goal-
directed and information-seeking actions, and that the models learned in the presence of these
actions were tailored to the agent’s behaviours and goal, and were also robust to bad-boot-
straps. Learning took place efficiently, requiring fewer interactions with the environment. The
learned models were also less complex, relative to other strategies. Importantly, models learned
via active inference departed in systematic ways from a veridical representation of the environ-
ment’s true structure. For these agents, the learned models supported adaptive behaviour not
only in spite of, but because of, their departure from veridicality.
Learning action-oriented models: Good and bad bootstraps
When learning generative models online in the presence of actions, there is a circular dynamic
in which learning is coupled to behaviour. The (partially) learned models are used to specify
actions, and these actions provide new data which is then used to update the model. This circu-
lar dynamic (or ‘information self-structuring’ [20]) raises the potential for both ‘good’ and
‘bad’ bootstraps.
If actions are selected based purely on (expected) instrumental value, then the resulting
learned models will be biased towards an agent’s behavioural profile and goals (or prior prefer-
ences under the active inference framework—see Fig 4c & 4e), but will also be strongly con-
strained by the model’s initial conditions. In our simulations, we showed that learning from
instrumental actions was prone to the instantiation of ‘bad-bootstraps’. Specifically, we dem-
onstrated that these agents typically learned an initially maladapted model due to insufficient
data or sub-optimal initialisation, and then subsequently used this model to determine goal-
directed actions. This resulted in agents engaging with the environment in a sub-optimal and
biased manner, thereby reintroducing sub-optimal data and causing models to become
entrenched within local minima. Recent work in model-based RL has identified this coupling
to be one of the major obstacles facing current model-based RL algorithms [62]. More gener-
ally, it is likely that bad-bootstraps are a prevalent phenomenon whenever parameters are used
to determine the data from which the parameters are learned. Indeed, this problem played a
significant role in motivating the (now common) use of ‘experience replay’ in model-free RL
[63]. Experience replay describes the method of storing past experiences to be later sampled
from for learning, thus breaking the tight coupling between learning and behaviour.
In the context of online learning, one way to avoid bad-bootstraps is to select actions based
on (expected) epistemic value [37, 40, 53], where agents seek out novel interactions based on
counterfactually informed beliefs about which actions will lead to informative transitions. By
utilising the uncertainty encoded by (beliefs about) model parameters, this approach can pro-
actively identify optimally informative transitions. In our simulations, we showed that agents
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using this strategy learned models that asymptoted towards veridicality and, as such, were not
tuned to any specific behavioural niche. This occurred because pure epistemic exploration
treats all uncertainties as equally important, meaning that agents were driven to resolve uncer-
tainty about all possible agent-environment contingencies. While models learned using this
strategy were able to support chemotactic behaviour (Fig 3a), learning was highly sample-
inefficient.
We have argued that a more suitable approach is to balance instrumental and epistemic
actions in a principled way during learning. This is what is achieved by the active inference
framework, via minimization of expected free energy. Minimizing expected free energy means
that the model uncertainties associated with an agent’s goals and desires are prioritised over
those which are not. Furthermore, it means that model uncertainties are only resolved until an
agent (believes that it) is sufficiently able to achieve its goals, such that agents need not resolve
all of their model uncertainty. In our simulations, we showed that active inference agents
learned models in a sample-efficient way, avoided being caught up in bad bootstraps, and gen-
erated well-adapted behaviour in our chemotaxis setting. Our data, therefore, support the
hypothesis that learning via active inference provides a principled and pragmatic approach to
the learning of well-adapted action-oriented generative models.
Exploration vs. exploitation
Balancing epistemic and instrumental actions recalls the well-known trade-off between explo-
ration and exploitation in reinforcement learning. In this context, the simplest formulation of
this trade-off can be construed as a model-free notion in which exploration involves random
actions. One example of this simple formulation is the ε-greedy algorithm which utilises noises
in the action selection process to overcome premature sub-optimal convergence [34]. While
an ε-greedy strategy might help overcome ‘bad-bootstraps’ by occasionally promoting explor-
atory actions, the undirected nature of random exploration is unlikely to scale to complex
environments.
The balance between epistemic and instrumental actions in our active inference agents is
more closely connected to the exploration-exploitation trade-off in model-based RL. As in our
agents, model-based RL agents often employ exploratory actions that are selected to resolve
model uncertainty. As we have noted, such actions can help avoid sub-optimal convergence
(bad bootstraps), especially at the early stages of learning where data is sparse. However, in
model-based RL it is normally assumed that, in the limit, a maximally comprehensive and
maximally accurate (i.e., veridical) model would be optimal. This is exemplified by approaches
that conduct an initial ‘exploration’ phase—in which the task is to construct a veridical model
from as few samples as possible—followed by a subsequent ‘exploitation’ phase. By contrast,
our approach highlights the importance of ‘goal-directed exploration’, in which the aim is not
to resolve all uncertainty to construct a maximally accurate representation of the environment,
but is instead to selectively resolve uncertainty until adaptive behaviour is (predicted to be)
possible. Moreover, we have demonstrated that goal-directed exploration allows exploration to
be contextualised by an agent’s goals. Specifically, we have shown that acting to simultaneously
explore and exploit the environment causes exploration to be biased towards parts of state
space that are relevant for goal-directed behaviour, thereby increasing the efficiency of explo-
ration. Therefore, our work suggests that acting to minimise expected free energy can benefit
learning by naturally affording an efficient form of goal-directed exploration.
This kind of goal-directed exploration highlights an alternative perspective on the explora-
tion-exploitation trade-off. We demonstrated that “exploitation”—traditionally associated
with exploiting the agent’s current knowledge to accumulate reward—can also lead to a type of
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constrained learning that leads to ‘action-oriented’ representations of the environment. In
other words, our results suggest that, in the context of model-learning, the “explore-exploit”
dilemma additionally entails an “explore-constrain” dilemma. This is granted a formal inter-
pretation under the active inference framework—as instrumental actions are associated with
soliciting observations that are consistent with the model’s prior expectations. However, given
the formal relationship between instrumental value in active inference and the Bellman equa-
tions [43], a similar trade-off can be expected to arise in any model-based RL paradigm.
Model non-veridicality
In our simulations, models learned through active inference were able to support adaptive
behaviour even when their structure and variables departed significantly from an accurate
representation of the environment. By design, the models utilized a severely impoverished
representation of the environment. An exhaustive representation would have required models
to encode information about the agent’s position, orientation, the position of the chemical
source, as well as a spatial map of the chemical concentrations so that determining an adaptive
action would require a complex transformation of these variables. In contrast, our model was
able to support adaptive behaviour by simply encoding a representation of the instantaneous
effects of action on the local chemical gradient. Therefore, rather than encoding a rich and
exhaustive internal mirror of nature, the model encoded a parsimonious representation of sen-
sorimotor couplings that were relevant for enabling action [64]. While this particular ‘action-
oriented’ representation was built-in through the design of the generative model, it nonetheless
underlines that models need not be homologous with their environment if they are to support
adaptive behaviour.
By evaluating the number of ‘redundant’ model parameters (as evaluated through Bayesian
model reduction), we further demonstrated that learning in the presence of goal-directed
behaviour leads to models that were more parsimonious in their representation of the environ-
ment, relative to other strategies (Fig 5b). Moreover, we showed that this strategy leads to
models that did not asymptote to veridicality, in terms of the accuracy of the model’s parame-
ters (Fig 4a). Interestingly, these agents nevertheless displayed high ‘active accuracy’ (i.e., the
predictive accuracy in the presence of self-determined actions), highlighting the importance of
contextualising model accuracy in terms of an agent’s actions and goals.
While these results demonstrate that models can support adaptive behaviour in spite of
their misrepresentation of the environment and that these misrepresentations afforded bene-
fits in terms of sample efficiency and model complexity, the active inference framework addi-
tionally provides a mechanism whereby misrepresentation enables adaptive behaviour. Active
inference necessarily requires an organism’s model to include systematic misrepresentations
of the environment, by virtue of the organism’s existence. Specifically, an organism’s genera-
tive model must encode a set of prior beliefs that distinguish it from its external environment.
For instance, the chemotaxis agents in the current simulation encoded the belief that observing
positive chemical gradients was a-priori more likely. From an objective and passive point of
view, these prior beliefs are, by definition, false. However, these systematic misrepresentations
can be realized through action, thereby giving rise to apparently purposeful and autopoietic
behaviour. Thus, under active inference, adaptive behaviour is achieved because of, and not
just in spite of, a models departure from veridicality [15].
Encoding frugal and parsimonious models plausibly afford organism’s several evolutionary
advantages. First, the number of model parameters will likely correlate with the metabolic cost
of that model. Moreover, simpler models will be quicker to deploy in the service of action and
perception and will be less likely to overfit the environment. This perspective, therefore,
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suggests that the degree to which exhaustive and accurate models are constructed should be
mandated by the degree to which they are necessary for on-going survival. If the mapping
between the external environment and allostatic responses is complex and manifold, then
faithfully modelling features of the environment may pay dividends. However, in the case that
frugal approximations and rough heuristics can be employed in the service of adaptive behav-
iour, such faithful modelling should be avoided. We showed that such “action-oriented” mod-
els arise naturally under ecologically valid learning conditions, namely, learning online in the
presence of goal-directed behaviour. However, action-oriented behaviour that was adapted to
the agent’s goals only arose under the minimisation of expected free energy.
It is natural to ask whether there are scenarios in which action-oriented models might
impede effective learning and adaptation. One such candidate scenario is transfer learning
[65], whereby existing knowledge is reapplied to novel tasks or environments. This form of
learning is likely to be important in biology, as for many organisms preferences can change
over time. If the novel task or environment requires a pattern of sensorimotor coordination
that is distinct from learned patterns of sensorimotor coordination, then a more exhaustive
model of the environment might indeed facilitate transfer learning. However, if adaptation in
the novel task or environment can be achieved through a subset of existing patterns of sensori-
motor coordination (i.e. in going from walking to running), then one might expect an action-
oriented representation to facilitate transfer learning, in so far as such representations reduce
the search space for learning the new behaviour. This type of transfer learning is closely related
to curriculum learning [66], whereby complex behaviours are learned progressively by first
learning a series of simpler behaviours. We leave it to future work to explore the scenarios in
which action-oriented models enable efficient transfer and curriculum learning.
Active inference
While any approach to balancing exploration and exploitation is amenable to the benefits
described in the previous sections, we have focused on the normative principle of active infer-
ence. From a purely theoretical perspective, active inference re-frames the exploration-exploi-
tation dilemma by suggesting that both exploration and exploitation are complementary
perspectives on a single objective function—the minimization of expected free energy. How-
ever, an open question remains as to whether this approach provides a practical solution to
balancing exploration and exploitation. On the one hand, it provides a practically useful recipe
by casting both epistemic and instrumental value in the same (information-theoretic) cur-
rency. However, the balance will necessarily depend on the shape of the agent’s beliefs about
hidden states, beliefs about model parameters, and prior beliefs about preferable observations.
In the current work, we introduced an artificial weighting term to keep the epistemic and
instrumental value within the same range. The same effect could have been achieved by con-
structing the shape (i.e. variance) of the prior preferences P(o).
Active inference also provides a suitable framework for investigating the emergence of
action-oriented models. Previous work has highlighted the fact that active inference is consis-
tent with, and necessarily prescribes, frugal and parsimonious generative models, thus provid-
ing a potential bridge between ‘representation-hungry’ approaches to cognition espoused by
classical cognitivism and the ‘representation-free’ approaches advocated by embodied and
enactive approaches [6, 12, 13, 64, 67–75].
This perspective has been motivated by at least three reasons. First, active inference is pro-
posed as a description of self-organization in complex systems [6]. Deploying generative mod-
els and minimizing free energy are construed as emergent features of a more fundamental
drive towards survival. On this account, the purpose of representation is not to construct a
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rich internal world model, but instead to capture the environmental regularities that allow the
organism to act adaptively.
The second reason is that minimizing free energy implicitly penalizes the complexity of the
generative model (see Appendix 1). This implies that minimizing free energy will reduce the
complexity (or parameters) required to go from prior beliefs to (approximately) posterior
beliefs, i.e. in explaining some observations. This occurs under the constraint of accuracy,
which makes sure that the inferred variables can sufficiently account for the observations. In
other words, minimizing free energy ensures that organism’s maximize the accuracy of their
predictions while minimizing the complexity of the models that are used to generate those
predictions.
As discussed in the previous section, active inference also requires agents to encode sys-
tematic misrepresentations of their environment. Our work has additionally introduced a
fourth motivation for linking active inference to adaptive action-oriented models, namely,
that the minimization of expected free energy induces a balance between self-sustaining
(and thus constrained) patterns of agent-environment interaction and goal-directed
exploration.
The arguments and simulations presented in this paper resonate with previous work which
views an active inference agent as a ‘crooked scientist’ [76, 77]. Here, an agent is seen as a ‘sci-
entist’ insofar as it seeks out information to enable more accurate predictions. However, this
work additionally highlights the fact that agents are biased by their own non-negotiable prior
beliefs and preferences, leading them to seek out evidence for these hypotheses. We have built
upon this previous work by exploring the types of models that are learned when an agent acts
as a ‘crooked scientist’.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the minimization of expected free energy (through
active inference) provides a principled and pragmatic solution to learning action-oriented
probabilistic models. These models can make the process of learning models of natural envi-
ronments tractable, and provide a potential bridge between ‘representation-hungry’
approaches to cognition and those espoused by enactive and embodied disciplines. More-
over, we showed how learning online in the presence of behaviour can give rise to ‘bad-boot-
straps’—a phenomenon that has the potential to be problematic whenever learning is
coupled with behaviour. Epistemic or information-seeking actions provide a plausible mech-
anism for overcoming bad-bootstraps. However, to exploration to be efficient, the epistemic
value of actions must be contextualized by agents goals and desires. The ability to learn
adapted models that are tailored to action provides a potential route to tractable and sample




The agent’s generative model specifies the joint probability over observations o, hidden state
variables s, control variables u and parameter variables θ. To account for temporal dependen-
cies among variables, we consider a generative model that is over a sequence of variables
through time, i.e. ~x ¼ fx1; :::; xtg, where tilde notation indicates a sequence from time t = 0 to
the current time t, and xt denotes the value of x at time t. The generative model is given by the
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Learning action-oriented models
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805 April 23, 2020 22 / 30
joint probability distribution Pð~o;~s; ~u; yjl; aÞ, where:
Pð~o;~s; ~u; yjl; aÞ ¼ PðyjaÞ
YT
t¼1
Pðotjst; lÞPðstjst  1; ut  1; yÞPðutÞ
Pðotjst; lÞ ¼ CatðlÞ
Pðstjst  1; ut  1; yÞ ¼ CatðyÞ
PðyjaÞ ¼ DirðaÞ
PðutÞ ¼ sð  ~GÞ
ð9Þ
where σ(�) is the softmax function. For simplicity, we initialize P(st=0) as a uniform distribu-
tion, and therefore exclude it from Eq 9.
The likelihood distribution specifies the probability of observing some chemical gradient ot
given a belief about the chemical gradient st. This distribution is described by a set of categori-
cal distributions, denoted Cat(�), where each categorical distribution is a distribution over k
discrete and exclusive possibilities. The parameters of a categorical distribution can be
represented as a vector with each entry describing the probability of some event pi, with
Pk
i¼1 pi ¼ 1. As the likelihood distribution is a conditional distribution, a separate categorical
distribution is maintained for each hidden state in S, (i.e. spos and sneg), where each of these
distributions specifies the conditional probability of observing some chemical gradient (either
opos and oneg). The parameters of the likelihood distribution can therefore be represented as a
2 x 2 matrix where each column j is a categorical distribution that describes P(ot|st = j, λ). For
the current simulations, we provide agents with the parameters λ and do not require these
parameters to be learned. The provided parameters encode the belief that there is an unambig-
uous mapping between spos and opos, and between sneg and oneg, meaning that λ can be
encoded as an identity matrix.
The prior probability over hidden states st is given by the transition distribution P(st|st−1,
ut−1, θ), which specifies the probability of the current hidden state, given beliefs about the pre-
vious hidden state and the previous control state. In other words, this distribution describes an
agent’s beliefs about how running and tumbling will cause changes in the chemical gradient.
Following previous work [38], we assume that agents know which control state was executed
at the previous time step. As with the likelihood distribution, the prior distribution is described
by a set of categorical distributions. Each categorical distribution j specifies the probability dis-
tribution P(st|st−1 = j, θ), such that P(st|st−1, θ) can again be represented as a 2 x 2 matrix. How-
ever, the transition distribution is also conditioned on control states u, meaning a separate
transition matrix is maintained for both urun and utumble, such that the transition distribu-
tion can be represented as a 2 x 2 x 2 tensor. Agents, therefore, maintain separate beliefs about
how the environment is likely to change for each control state.
We require agents to learn the parameters θ of the transition distribution. At the start of
each learning period, we randomly initialize θ, such that agents start out with random beliefs
about how actions cause transitions in the chemical gradient. To enable these parameters to be
learned, the generative model encodes (time-invariant) prior beliefs over θ in the distribution
P(θ|α). This distribution is modelled as Dirichlet distribution, denoted Dir(�), where α are the
parameters of this distribution. A Dirichlet distribution represents a distribution over the
parameters of a distribution. In other words, sampling from this distribution returns a vector
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of parameters, rather than a scalar. By maintaining a distribution over θ, the task of learning
about the environment is transformed into a task of inferring unknown variables.
Finally, the prior probability of control states is proportional to a softmax transformation of
  ~G, which is a vector of (negative) expected free energies, with one entry for each control
state. This formalizes the notion that control states are a-priori more likely if they are expected
to minimize free energy. We provide a full specification of expected free energy in the follow-
ing sections.
The approximate posterior
The approximate posterior encodes an agent’s current approximately posterior beliefs about
the chemical gradient s, the control state u and model parameters θ. As with the generative
model, the approximate posterior is over a sequence of variables Qð~s; ~u; yj�Þ, where ϕ are the
sufficient statistics of the distribution.
In order to make inference tractable, we utilize the mean-field approximation to factorize
the approximate posterior. This approximation treats a potentially high-dimensional distribu-
tion as a product of a number of simpler marginal distributions. Heuristically, this treats cer-
tain variables as statistically independent. Practically, it allows us to infer individual variables
while keeping the remaining variables fixed. This approximation makes inference tractable, at
the (potential) price of making inference sub-optimal. For inference to be optimal, the factori-
zation of the approximate posterior must match the factorization of the true posterior.
Here, we factorize over time, the beliefs about the chemical gradient, the beliefs about
model parameters and the beliefs about control states:





Qðstj�st Þ ¼ Catð�stÞ
Qðutj�ut Þ ¼ Catð�utÞ
ð10Þ
Inference, learning and action
Having defined the generative model and the approximate posterior, we can now specify how
free energy can be minimized. In brief, this involves updating the sufficient statistics of the
approximate posterior ϕ as new observations are sampled. To minimize free energy, we iden-
tify the derivative of free energy with respect to the sufficient statistics
@Fð�;oÞ
@�
, solve for zero, i.e.
@Fð�;oÞ
@�
¼ 0, and rearrange to give the variational updates that minimize free energy. Given the
mean-field assumption, we can perform this scheme separately for each of the partitions of ϕ,
i.e �st , �ut and ϕα.
For the current scheme, the update equations for the hidden state parameters ϕs are (see
Appendix 5 for a full derivation):
�st ¼ sð lnPðotjst; lÞ þ lnPðstjst  1; ut  1; yÞÞ ð11Þ
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This equation corresponds to state estimation or ‘perception’ and can be construed as a
Bayesian filter that combines the likelihood of the current observation with a prior belief that
is based on the previous hidden state and the previous control state. To implement this update
in practice, we rewrite Eq 11 in terms of the relevant parameters and sufficient statistics (see
Appendix 5):
�st ¼ sð lnl � ~ot þ
�yut  1 � �st  1Þ













Here, ~ot is a one-hot encoded vector specifying the current observation, θ
u specifies the
transition distribution corresponding to control state u, and ψ(�) is the digamma function.
Note that the parameters of the likelihood distribution λ are point-estimates of a categorical
distribution, meaning it is possible to straightforwardly take the logarithm of this distribution.
However, the beliefs about θ are described by the Dirichlet distribution Q(θ|α), meaning that
the mean of the logarithm of this distribution (denoted �y) must be evaluated (leading to lines
two and three of Eq 12).
Learning can be conducted in a similar manner by updating the parameters ϕα (see Appen-







½at  1 ¼ ut  1� � x�st�st  1 ð13Þ
where [�] is an inversion bracket that returns one if the statement inside the bracket is true and
zero otherwise, and ξ is an artificial learning rate, set to 0.001 for all simulations. Note that we
update the parameters ϕα after each iteration, but use a small learning rate to simulate the dif-
ference in time scales implied by the factorization of the generative model and approximate
posterior. This update bears a resemblance to Hebbian plasticity, in the sense that the probabil-
ity of each parameter increases if the corresponding transition is observed (i.e. ‘fire together
wire together’).
Finally, actions can be inferred by updating the parameters �ut , where the update is given
by (see Appendix 5 for a full derivation):
�ut ¼ sð 
~GÞ ð14Þ
This equation demonstrates that the (approximately) posterior beliefs over control states
are proportional to the vector of negative expected free energies. In other words, the posterior
and prior beliefs about control states are identical.
Expected free energy
In this section, we describe how to evaluate the vector   ~G. This is a vector of negative expected
free energies, with one for each control state u 2 U . As specified in the formalism, the negative
expected free energy for a single control state is defined as −Gτ(ut), where τ is some future
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time point, and, for the current simulations:





As described in the results section, we ignore the epistemic value for hidden states, as there
is no uncertainty in the likelihood distribution. Moreover, for all simulations, τ = t + 1, such
that we only consider the immediate the immediate effects of action. This scheme is, however,
entirely consistent with a sequence of actions, i.e. a policy.
In order to evaluate expected free energy, we rewrite Eq 15 in terms of parameters. By not-
ing that EQðot ;st ;yjut ;�tÞ½ lnPðotÞ� ¼ EQðot jut ;�tÞ½ lnPðotÞ�, we can write instrumental value as:
EQðotjut ;�tÞ½ lnPðotÞ� ¼ �ot � r ð16Þ
where �ot are the sufficient statistics of Q(oτ|ut, ϕτ), and ρ are the parameters of P(oτ), which is
a categorical distribution, such that ρ is a vector with one entry for each o 2 O. In order to
evaluate parameter epistemic value, we utilise the following approximation:












For details of this approximation, we refer the reader to [40]. For a given control state ut,
negative expected free energy can, therefore, be calculated as:
  GtðutÞ ¼ �st �W
ut � �st þ dð�ot � rÞ ð18Þ
where �st are the sufficient statistics of Q(sτ|ut, ϕτ) and δ is an optional weighting term. For all
simulations, this is set to 1/10. To calculate Eq 18, it is first necessary to evaluate the expected
beliefs Q(sτ|ut, ϕτ) and Q(oτ|ut, ϕτ). The expected distribution over hidden states Q(sτ|ut, ϕτ) is
given by EQðst jut ;�tÞ½Pðstjst; ut; yÞ�. Given these beliefs over future hidden states, we can evaluate
Q(oτ|ut, ϕτ) as EQðst jut ;�tÞ½Pðotjst; lÞ�.
The full update scheme for the agents is provided in algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Active inference MDP algorithm
Require: parameters of likelihood distribution λ, parameters of prior
distribution over transition distribution parameters α, prior proba-
bility of observations ρ
1: for t in T do
2: ot  env.observe() ⊲ Sample observation from environment
3: �st ¼ sðln l � ~ot þ
�yut  1 � �st  1Þ ⊲ Hidden state
inference
4: �ut ¼ sð 
~GÞ ⊲ Control state inference
5: where   GtðutÞ ¼ �st �W
ut � �st|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Epistemic agent
þ �ot � r|fflffl{zfflffl}
Instrumental agent
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}





t¼1½at  1 ¼ ut  1� � x�st�st  1 ⊲ Learning inference
7: at � Qðutj�ut Þ ⊲ Sample action
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8: env.update(at) ⊲ Perform action
9: end for
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